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DUTY OF INNOCENT PURCHASER

the insurer will gamble with the insured's money, since rejection of an
offer within policy limits will expose the carrier to double liability, and
(2) would determine the outer limits of the insurer's liability, absent
actual bad faith. Such a provision would be more reasonable than court
imposition of strict liability, which would frequently impose liability for
exercising a contractual right, often one approved by the state legislature." Before such drastic action is taken, the legislature should give
its express sanction.
JAMES R. CARPENrER, JR.

Labor Law-Innocent Purchaser's Duty to Reinstate Employees
The NLRB, under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, has authority to issue a remedial order against an employer who
"has engaged in or is engaging in .. . unfair labor practice[s]."I The
exercise of this authority is unquestioned when the order is directed
against the guilty employer. If the guilty employer sells his business
before the unfair practice has been remedied, however, the Board must
decide whether the order may be directed against the purchaser. If the
purchaser is but a "disguised continuance" of the seller' or one who has
concerted with the guilty employer to evade the order,' the Board may
properly direct an order against the purchaser. When the purchase is
made in good faith, the problems are more acute. An examination of the
decisions reveals the Board's difficulties.
Initially, the Board recognized no limitation as to the parties who
could be bound by an order under Section 10(c) once an unfair labor
practice was discovered. In the 1948 decision of Alexander Milburn Co.,4
a purchaser, who was neither a "disguised continuance" nor an "evader,"

rd.

"IE.g., N.C. GEr. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953).
1
National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
If... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person . .. has engaged
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board ...shall
issue ...an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay as will effectuate the policies of this
Act.
, Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); Southport Petro. Co. v.
NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
' Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960).
'78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1948).
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was ordered to reinstate employees wrongfully discharged by his predecessor. The Board, however, did recognize the policy favoring free
alienation as it limited the class of "innocent purchasers" upon whom
the order would be binding to those who were found to be "successors"
of the previous employers. A "successor" was defined as one who continued the seller's business operations in substantially unchanged form.
In Milburn, this was evidenced by the retention of the predecessor's employees and plant and by the manufacture of the same products.
Upon subsequent judicial examination, Section 10(c) was held not
to encompass an innocent purchaser. Two courts of appeals' reasoned
that the enforceability of a Board order was limited by Rule 65(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 concluding that an innocent purchaser was not a "party to the action" under a statute applicable only to
those "engaged in or engaging in" unfair labor practices. The Board,
following this judicial mandate, overruled Milburn in Symns Grocer Co.,
In Perma Vinyl Corp.,9 the Board reversed its position again by
ordering a purchaser to reinstate employees discharged by the previous
owner in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act,", despite a
finding that the successor was a "bona fide purchaser."" United States
Pipe & Foundry Co. had purchased the assets of Perma Vinyl Corporation with knowledge of a pending unfair labor charge against Perma
Vinyl, and had continued the manufacture of plastic pipe in the same
manner with substantially the same work force. After the acquisition,
the Board issued an order requiring Perma Vinyl and "its successors
and assigns" to reinstate the employees. U.S. Pipe was served notice to
appear and show cause why it should not be charged as Perma Vinyl's
5

Id. at 748.
'NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale
Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953).
7
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides that
[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order . . . is
binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees .... and upon those persons in active concert or participation
with them ....
8 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).
'164
N.L.R.B. No. 119 (May 24, 1967).
"0National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3)
(1964). The Board found that Perma Vinyl had discharged three employees because of their affiliation with a labor union.
" 164 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (May 24, 1967). As employed in this context, "bona
fide purchaser" may be a misleading phrase. U.S. Pipe did have notice of the
NLRB proceeding and, therefore, is to be distinguished from a bona fide purchaser
in the law of real property who must take without notice. E.g., Companaro v.
Gondolfo, 60 F.2d 451, 452 (3rd Cir. 1932).
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successor with remedying the unfair practices. Following an adverse
ruling, U.S. Pipe petitioned the court to have the order set aside.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States Pipe and Foundry v. NLRB' affirmed the Board's decision. Finding support in the
Supreme Court decision of John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,3
which had bound a purchaser to his predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement, the court directed that the order be enforced on the successorship theory of Alexander Milburn Co. Seizing upon the language in
Wiley that "[t]he objectives of the national labor policy ... require that
the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their business . . . be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden
change in the employment relationship,"' 4 the court concluded that "purchasing with notice of the unfair labor proceedings and continuing the
same operation even to the jobs in question ... is . . . sufficient basis for
requiring it to offer reinstatement to the employees on the successorship
theory"' 5 of Alexander Millburn.
Although the Milburn reasoning was revived, the decision did not
fully resolve the difficulty with innocent purchaser liability, for the court
based its decision on policy considerations and never explicitly faced the
legal bar presented by the earlier courts of appeals decisions.' 6 U.S. Pipe
would constitute stronger precedent for future board rulings had these
contrary holdings been dealt with adequately.
There are two possible approaches that the court could have taken to
support its policy. As to the limitation posed by Federal Rule 65(d),
the court may be justified in considering U.S. Pipe a "party to the action." In Symns Grocer Co.,' 7 which initially overruled Milburn, the
Board reasoned that the scope of their order was limited by Rule 65 (d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that a successor
employer, who had not acted with his predecessor to evade the charge
and who was not a disguised continuance, could not be reached by an
order under Section 10(c). The purpose of the limitations in Rule
65(d) apparently is to prevent unwitting contempt,'" and U.S. Pipe, in
the instant case, had notice of the NLRB proceedings against Perma
12398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
12376 U.S. 543 (1964).
1
'Id. at 549.
"United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1968).
10 See note 6 supra.
17 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).
"See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945).
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Vinyl and was given an opportunity to be heard. This circumstance,
added to the fact that the Board's orders are remedial rather than punitive in nature, 9 appear to justify an order against such a "bona fide purchaser."
An alternative approach would be for the Board to proceed directly
against U.S. Pipe as the guilty employer, which would preclude any
problem raised by Federal Rule 65(d). The Board has previously imposed only derivative responsibility in such cases,2 ° seemingly on the
ground that it was not the purchaser who committed the violation. This
approach, however, is inconsistent with the "evader" cases 2 ' and seems
to belie the plain import of the language in Section 10(c), which provides
that the Board may issue an order against an employer who "has engaged
in or is engaging in

. .

. unfair labor practices." 22

An evader, unlike a

disguised continuance, is not the party that discharged the employees,
but one who, by his acts, has engaged in unfair labor practices. Therefore, "engaging in unfair labor practices" may be construed to include not
only those persons committing the violation, but also employers who, by
their failure to afford a remedy, allow the harmful effects of a violation
to continue.
Assuming that a "bona fide purchaser" can be validly bound by a
Board order, there still remain policy restrictions on the exercise of this
authority. These restrictions, which are embodied in the successorship
theory, are seldom adequately articulated.
It is obvious that the purchaser must have the present capacity to
comply with the order. If reinstatement is to be required, the jobs must
still exist; the Board cannot order an employer to hire more men than
he needs or to employ a person for whom there is no work.2" This limitation upon the Board's power is qualified to the extent that an employer may be required to discharge employees hired subsequent to the
violation to create openings for those ordered to be reinstated.24 Also,
the Board may require the employer to put the injured employees on a
preferential hiring list.25
" Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940) ; Frosty Morn Meats,
Inc. 0v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1961).
" NLRB v. Harris, 198 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
21 See note 3 supra.
22 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
22
NLRB v. Lightener Pub. Corp., 128 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940).
"'NLRB v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1944);
v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941).
NLRB
2
NLRB v. J.G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1943).
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Notice before the purchase that there is an unfair labor practice
charge against the seller is a second element of the successorship theory.
U.S. Pipe and Alexander Milburn emphasized actual knowledge, and the
ruling in M. Yoseph Bag Co. 6 suggests that the Board will require such
notice. In M. Yoseph, the Board refused to order a remedy, although
the predecessor was an officer, director, and large stockholder in the purchasing corporation. Since information of the charge is readily available, either by an inquiry to the union or to the NLRB itself, it would
not appear to be inequitable to bind a purchaser to constructive notice,
and future rulings may so hold.
The successorship theory may also require an affirmative showing
that the labor policy of the purchaser will be the same as that of the predecessor-employer. The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act
is to lessen industrial strife,2 7 and to this end the Act protects the right
of employees to engage in union activities. 8 The most serious consequence of a dismissal in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) is the
deterrence of these activities. 9 This deterrence was not alleviated by the
change in ownership in either U.S. Pipe or Alexander Milburn. In the
former, although there was a new owner, the president of Perma Vinyl
became U.S. Pipe's general manager; the old employer was still influencing the labor policy and the deterrence to unionization remained. In
Alexander Milburn the court was careful to note that the purchaser retained his predecessor's plant manager and supervisory personnel. "Under these circumstances, the employees had no reason to believe that the
labor policies of the successor were other than those of the predecessor." 3 0
Therefore, the policy favoring the issuance of a remedial order is not
weakened by the change in ownership. A different situation unfolds if
there is a complete change in the employing enterprise before a remedy
has been effected. Although the new employer continues the same operation in the latter situation, an employee is not justified in believing that
there will still be discriminations in violation of the Act, for all ties binding the new labor policy with the old are broken. Under these circumstances, there is no deterrence of union activities and the policy favoring
the issuance of an order against the new owner is considerably weakened.
This suggests that the phrase often identified with the successorship
theory, "similarity and continuity of operations across the change of
20139 N.L.R.B. 310 (1962).
"'National Labor Relations Act § l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964).
" National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
8Ford Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 994, 1009 (1941).
" Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747, 750-51 (1948).
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refers not so much to the making of the same products in

the same plant, but to an appearance to the employee of a continuation
of the old labor policy, which, in turn, frustrates the policies of the National Labor Relations Act.
An innocent purchaser can now be required by the NLRB to remedy
the unfair labor practices of his predecessor under the successorship
theory. Although an unrestricted exercise of this authority may place
an unjust burden upon the purchaser, an examination of the contractual
options available to the purchaser indicates that innocent purchaser liability, as limited by the successorship theory, is not manifestly unfair.
If the prospective buyer has notice of the unfair labor charge, as required
by U.S. Pipe, he can insulate himself from the hardships imposed by the
subsequent order either by negotiating for a reduced purchase price or
for an indemnity clause in the contract of sale. Admittedly, the innocent
purchaser cannot be relieved of all the burdens through contractual agreement ;32 however, any remaining burden is negligible when contrasted to
the deleterious effects of an unremedied violation. In light of this consideration, the court in U.S. Pipe properly balanced the equities.
JERRY W. LEONARD

Real Property-Mortgagee's Rights in Security
The California Supreme Court, in the recent decision of American
Savings & Loan Association v. Leeds,' imposed significant limitations
on a purchase money mortgagee's rights to his security. Contrary to the
situations in other states, the California mortgagee finds himself in an
increasingly precarious position. The Leeds decision not only increases
the mortgagee's risk, but also injects a degree of uncertainty into the law.
The plaintiff in Leeds was the beneficiary of a deed of trust given to
secure a debt defendant Leeds had incurred to purchase real estate from
defendants Sheridan. The Sheridans had falsely represented that the
house had been built on unfilled land and had also concealed defects
caused by subsidence due to improper filling. After the sale, when further

"United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1968).
2 For example, a stigma possibly attaches to an employer involved in an unfair
labor proceeding.
I
Cal. 2d -, 440 P.2d 933, 68 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1968).

